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STATUTORY COMMENTS
"OTHER INSURANCE" CLAUSES IN GARAGE
LIABILITY POLICIES
Conflicting "other insurance"' clauses in automobile liability in-
surance policies have been the source of much litigation.2 Such clauses
usually provide either that the coverage normally extended under the
policy will not apply when there is "other valid and collectible insur-
ance" covering the same loss (i.e., the standard "other insurance"
clause) or that the policy will provide coverage only in "excess" of the
limits of such other insurance (i.e., the "excess insurance" clause).
3
The conflict arises when two insurance policies appear to extend
coverage to the driver of the vehicle but each insurer denies liability
on the basis of the "other insurance" clauses in their respective policies.
The General Assembly of Virginia has recently taken a stand on
this issue by amending Virginia's motor vehicle liability insurance
statute.4 The amendment provides in part:
Such policy or contract of bodily injury liability insurance,
or of property damage liability insurance, which provides insur-
ance to a named insured against liability arising from the own-
"'Other insurance" clauses are "clauses which purport to vary the coverage
of the policy if there is another policy or other policies protecting the risk insured
against." Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 502, 503 (g6i).
'See Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 1163 (1956).
3A third type of "other insurance" clause in addition to the standard "other
insurance" and the "excess insurance" clauses is the "pro-rata" clause which gen-
erally provides that in the event of other insurance, the policy containing the
"pro-rata" clause will be liable only for a proportion of the loss that represents
a ratio between the limit of liability stated in that policy and the total limits of
liability in all other valid and collectible insurance covering the loss. See gen-
erally Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 502, 503 (1961). For cases involving a conflict between
two "pro-rata" clauses, see Liberty Universal Ins. Go. v. National Sur. Corp., 338
F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1964); Celina Mut. Cas. Co. v. Citizens Gas. Co., 194 Md. 236,
71 A.2d 2o (g5o). See generally Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 611 (1952). For cases involving
a conflict between a standard "other insurance" clause and a "pro-rata" clause, see
McFarland v. Chicago Express, Inc., 200 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1952); Air. Transp. Mfg.
Co. v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 91 Cal. App. 2d 129, 204 P.2d 647 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1949). See generally Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 1163, 1167-68 (1956). For cases
involving a conflict between an "excess" clause and a "pro-rata" clause, see Globe
Indem. Co. v. Capital Ins. & Sur. Co., 352 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1965); Citizens Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 273 F.2d i89 (6th Cir. 1959); Lamb-Weston,
Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Ore. 11o, 341 P.2d 11O (1959). See generally
Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 502 (1961).
'VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-381 (Supp. 1968).
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ership, maintenance or use of any motor vehicle in the business
of selling, repairing, servicing, storing or parking motor vehicles
may contain a provision that the insurance coverage applicable
to such motor vehicles afforded a person other than the named
insured and his employees in the course of their employment
shall not be applicable if there is any other valid and col-
lectible insurance applicable to the same loss covering such per-
son under a policy with limits at least equal to the financial
responsibility requirements specified in § 46.1-504 of the Code
of Virginia..,
The precise situation which the amendment was intended to clarify
was recently presented to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
in the companion cases of American Motorists Insurance Co. v.
KaplanG and Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Celina Mutual
Insurance Co.
7
In Kaplan, defendant was given permission to test drive an auto-
mobile owned by the John Copeland Motor Company in Norfolk.
The vehicle was insured by American Motorists Insurance Company
(hereinafter referred to as American). While driving this vehicle,
the defendant collided with a vehicle operated by Kaplan, who sub-
sequently recovered a judgment against the defendant. The defendant
was an insured under a family automobile policy issued to his step-
father by the Government Employees Insurance Company (herein-
after referred to as GEICO). The defendant was also covered under
American's policy issued to the automobile dealer as one driving with
the permission of the named insured.8 GEICO contended that Ameri-
'VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-381 (a3) (Supp. 1968). The second paragraph of the
1968 amendment reads as follows:
In the event that such other valid and collectible insurance has limits
less than the financial responsibility requirements specified in § 46.1-504
of the Code of Virginia, then the coverage afforded a person other than
the named insured and his employees in the course of their employment
shall be applicable to whatever extent may be necessary to equal the
financial responsibility requirements specified in § 46.1-504 of the Code
of Virginia.
62o9 Va. 53, 161 S.E.2d 675 (1968).
72o9 Va. 60, 161 S.E.2d 68o (1968).
8American's policy included an "omnibus clause" as required by VA. CODE
ANN. § 38.1-381(a) (Supp. 1968). The pertinent part of this statute reads as follows:
No policy or contract of bodily injury liability insurance, or of
property damage liability insurance covering liability arising from the
ownership, maintenance or use of any motor vehicle... shall be issued
or delivered in this State ... unless it contains a provision insuring the
named insured and any other person responsible for the use of or using
the motor vehicle... with the consent, express or implied, of the named
insured .... (emphasis added).
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can's policy constituted primary coverage and therefore GEICO was
not liable since its policy contained an "excess insurance" clause.9
American contended that the "other insurance" clause'10 in the policy
issued to the John Copeland Motor Company relieved American from
any liability. Affirming the decision of the lower court, the Supreme
Court of Appeals held the "other insurance" clause in American's
policy invalid as being contrary to the omnibus clause.'1 Thus, primary
liability was imposed upon American, the insurer of the vehicle.
In Kaplan and Celina Mutual2 the court examined the "other
The policy issued by GEICO contained a clause designated "Other Insurance"
which provides:
Other Insurance: If the insured has other insurance against a loss
covered by Part I [Bodily injury and property damage liability) of this
policy-the company shall not be liable under this policy for a greater
proportion of such loss than the applicable limit of liability stated in the
declaration bears to the total applicable limit of liability of all valid and
collectible insurance against such loss; provided, however, the insurance
with respect to a temporary substitute automobile or non-owned auto-
mobile shall be excess insurance over any other valid and collectible in-
surance.
209 Va. at 54-55, 161 S.E.ad at 677.
"Attached to the garage liability policy issued by American was an endorse-
ment specified as "Auto 89-Limited Coverage for Certain Insureds," which amend-
ed paragraph 3 of "Persons Insured" to read:
(3) With respect to an automobile to which the insurance applies under
paragraph i(a) of the Automobile Hazards, any of the following persons
while using such automobiles with the permission of the named insured,
provided such person's actual operation or (if he is not operating) his
other actual use thereof is within the scope of such permission:
(a) Any employee, director or stockholder of the named insured, any
partner therein and any resident of the same -household of the named
insured, such employee, director, stockholder or partner.
(b) Any other person, but only if no other valid and collectible auto-
mobile liability insurance, either primary or excess, with limits of liability
at least equal to the minimum limits specified by the financial responsi-
bility law of the State in which the automobile is principally garaged,
is available to such person; .... (emphasis added) 209 Va. at 55, 161 S.E.2d
at 77.
"The court, however, found the "excess insurance" provision relating to the
operation of non-owned vehicles contained in the policy issued by GEICO to
be a valid limitation of coverage. The court said:
The omnibus statute (§ 38.1-381(a)) does not require that coverage be
afforded a permissive user of a non-owned vehicle. It only requires that
the owner's policy extend coverage to a permissive user for liability 're-
sulting in the operation or use of such [owner's] vehicle.' 29o Va. at 58, 161
S.E.2d at 679.
"Kaplan and Celina Mutual were tried together in the lower court where
it was stipulated that the two cases involved identical issues and that the de-
cision in one was determinative in the other. On appeal, the Supreme Court of
1969]
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insurance" clauses in conjunction with each policy's omnibus clause.
The omnibus clause provides that the same coverage available to
the named insured will also be extended to any person operating the
insured vehicle with the permission of the named insured. It is
required by statute in Virginia that all motor vehicle liability policies
issued in the State contain such a clause' 3 and this coverage will
be read into the policy regardless of whether or not it is so written in
by the insurance company' 4 Kaplan and Celina Mutual held that the
omnibus clause precluded any limitations on the insurer's liability
inconsistent with the coverage afforded thereunder 15 and thus found
the "other insurance" clause invalid. However, by virtue of the 1968
amendment to § 38.1-381 of the Code of Virginia there is a statutory
qualification to absolute omnibus clause coverage. The result is that
the statute now makes "lawful" essentially16 the same clause that was
held to be invalid in Kaplan and Celina Mutual. It should be noted,
however, that the amendment is limited in its application.
First, the "other insurance" clause now permitted under the statute
may be included only in garage liability policies.' 7 Such policies are
generally issued to automobile dealers, garages, and service stations.
Appeals of Virginia reached the same conclusion in Celina Mutual as it did
in Kaplan. In its opinion in the Celina Mutual case, the court said:
[The] assignments of error raise the same issues as those presented in
American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Kaplan, et al., supra. The decision in that
case, which affirmed the holding of the court below, is controlling here and
reference to it is hereby made.
209 Va. at 62-63, 161 S.E.2d at 682.
1"VA. CODE ANN. § 38-38i(a) (Supp. 19
6 8). See Lumbermans Mut. Cas. Co. v.
Indemnity Ins. Co., 186 Va. 204, 42 S.E.2d 298 (1947); accord, Maryland Cas. Co.
v. Burley, 345 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1965).
"Newton v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 107 F.2d 164 (4 th Cir. 1939)
(interpreting the Virginia statute); Maxey v. American Cas. Co., i8o Va. 285, 23
S.E.2d 221 (1942).
"Accord, Maryland Cas. Co. v. Burley, 345 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1965) (interpret-
ing the Virginia statute); Pulley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 242 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Va. 1965)
(interpreting the Virginia statute).
"The clause which is now permissible under § 38.1-381 (a3) (Supp. 1968) of
the Code of Virginia is not worded exactly like the clause which the court held
to be invalid in Kaplan. The clause considered in that case included the phrase
"either primary or excess" following the terms "other valid and collectible in-
surance." See note 1o supra, wherein the entire clause is quoted. However, the
wording of the clause approved in § 38.1-381 (a3) (Supp. 1968) does not include the
phrase "either primary or excess." The possible importance of this distinction
will he discussed later in this comment. See text accompanying note 29 infra.
'-Garage liability policies are those "which are specifically designed to protect
garagekeepers, operators of service, rental, and repair stations, or dealers, against
loss by reason of injury to the person or property of others in certain defined
situations." Annot., 93 A.L.R,.2d lo47, 1o49 (1964).
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Thus, the statute does not provide for incorporation of such a limiting
clause in the standard family automobile policy.
Second, the clause applies only to a permissive driver other than
the named insured and his employees in the course of their employ-
ment. Furthermore, this person must be an insured under another
policy of automobile liability insurance providing coverage for the
same loss and with limits at least equal to the financial responsibility
requirements specified in § 46.1-504 of the Code of Virginia.'8 If
the permissive driver is covered by another policy of automobile in-
surance with limits less than the financial responsibility requirements
under the Code of Virginia, the second paragraph of the 1968 amend-
ment provides that the coverage under the garage liability policy will
be applicable to whatever extent may be necessary to equal the fi-
nancial responsibility requirements.' 9 In addition, where the per-
missive driver has no other valid and collectible insurance, it is
apparent from a reading of the statute that the garage liability policy
will afford the driver the same coverage that applies to the named
insured by virtue of the policy's omnibus clause. This is consistent
with the rationale behind the omnibus clause-namely, to protect
persons who have suffered damage by the negligent use of the in-
sured's motor vehicle when operated by another with the permission
of the named insured.2 0
Third, no reference is made in the statute to either collision or
comprehensive coverage. Thus, it must be assumed that it is not the
purpose of the statute to alter the coverage within these areas.
Within the limitations above it appears that the purpose of the
1968 amendment is to allow insurance companies issuing garage
liability policies to limit their liability under the policy's omnibus
clause by the inclusion of a provision that will make the driver's in-
surance (if any) primarily liable for the loss. The effect, of course, is
to overrule cases like Kaplan and Celina Mutual. The question now
"'The financial responsibility requirements specified in VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-504
(Supp. 1968) are:
... twenty thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of one
person in any one accident ... thirty thousand dollars because of bodily
injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident, and ...
five thousand dollars because of injury to or destruction of property of
others in any one accident.
"'The second paragraph of the amendment is quoted supra at note 5.
!Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tiller, x89 Va. 544, 53 S.E.2d 814 (1949); accord,
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Venable, 194 Va. 357, 73 S.E.2d 366 (1952).
1969]
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remains as to how well the statute will operate to perform its intended
function.
Inherent in the drafting of any piece of legislation is the problem
of wording the statute in a way which will completely cover the
situation to be remedied and thereby accomplish the intended pur-
pose. Examining the 1968 amendment in light of this problem, one
phrase in particular might well leave room for a broader interpreta-
tion by the courts than was intended. The statute provides, in part,
that the coverage under the garage liability policy "afforded a person
other than the named insured ... shall not be applicable if there is
any other valid and collectible insurance applicable to the same loss
covering such person .... -"21 In construing the meaning of a phrase
of this type (e.g., the standard "other insurance" escape clause) the
courts have necessarily had to determine exactly what constitutes
"other valid and collectible insurance" within the meaning of the
policy. An obvious problem- arises when the other insurance policy
also contains an escape or limiting clause similar to the clause in the
policy under consideration. 22 The case in which the other policy
contains an "excess insurance" clause is illustrative of the problem.
23
Traditionally, where there has been a conflict between an insur-
ance policy containing an "other insurance" clause and another policy
containing an "excess insurance" clause, a majority of the courts have
held that the policy containing the "other insurance" clause affords
primary coverage.24 These courts have reasoned that the policy con-
2
1 VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-38(a3) (Supp. 1968) (emphasis added).
2The three principal types of "other insurance" clauses are (1) the standard
"other insurance" or "no-liability escape" clause, (2) the "excess insurance" clause,
and (3) the "pro-rata" clause. See note 3, supra, and text accompanying note 3.
See generally Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d'i163 (1956).
"The situation under which a conflict will most likely arise when one of the
policies is a garage liability policy is where a customer or prospective customer
of the insured to whom the policy is issued is driving an automobile insured under
the garage policy. If the customer is involved in an accident while driving such
vehicle and is himself insured under a standard family automobile policy, the
conflict in Virginia will generally be between the "other insurance" clause in the
garage policy and an "excess insurance" clause in the driver's policy. This is true
because in Virginia, the wording of the standard family policy "escape clause" reads
"...provided, however, the insurance with respect to a temporary substitute auto-
mobile or non-owned automobile shall be excess insurance over any other valid
and collectible insurance." Such a clause is set out in full supra at note 9.
aZurich Gen. Accident : Liab. Ins. Co. v. Clamor, 124 F.2d 717 (7th Cir.
1941); Michigan Alkali Co. v. Bankers Indem. Ins. Co., 1o3 F.-d 345 (2d Cir. 1939);
Continental Cas. Co. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 94 F.2d 71o (3d Cir. 1938); Travelers
Indem. Co. v. State Auto. Ins. Co., 67 Ohio App. 457, 37 N.E.2d 198 (1941). See
generally Annot., 46 A.L.PR.2d 1163, 1164-65 (1956).
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taining the "excess insurance" clause does not provide other insur-
ance coverage within the meaning of the "other insurance" clause and,
thus, the policy containing the "other insurance" clause is liable for
the entire loss up to the limits of that policy. As stated by the court
in Zurich General Accident & Liability Insurance Co. v. Clamor:25
A decision must rest upon a construction of the language
employed by the respective insurers. Zurich affords no protec-
tion where there is 'other valid and collectible insurance.' Car
and General provides 'the insurance shall be excess insurance
over any other valid and collectible insurance.' It will be noted
that the language employed by Zurich in this respect is general
in its nature, while that employed by Car and General is
specific, or, at any rate, more specific than Zurich.
There is no case, so far as we are aware, where the precise
question has been decided. There are cases which have held or
indicated, under somewhat similar circumstances, that the spe-
cific language is controlling over the general. We think that
construction should be applied in the instant situation. Any
other construction would ignore the specific language em-
ployed by Car and General. The 'excess insurance' provided by
the latter is not 'other insurance' required by Zurich.26
The Virginia courts and the federal courts interpreting Virginia
law heretofore have not used the rationale of Zurich in denying ef-
fect to the "other insurance" clause.27 Rather, as indicated above,28
they have held such provisions to be in conflict with the omnibus
clause and therefore invalid. However, the 1968 amendment now
makes, in limited situations, the use of such clauses permissible. Never-
theless, by virtue of the 1968 amendment the Virginia courts will now
have to determine what constitutes "other valid and collectible insur-
ance"; and it is conceivable that they might adhere to the rationale of
Zurich.
In an effort to avoid such decisions as that in Zurich, certain in-
surance companies modified the wording of their "other insurance"
clauses to read, "if there is other valid and collectible insurance, either
primary or excess."29 At least one court has seized upon this change
';124 F.2d 717 (7 th Cir. 1941).
2Id. at 720 (emphasis addded).
"See Maryland Cas. Co. v. Burley, 345 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1965); Pulley v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 242 F. Supp. 33o (E.D. Va. 1965); American Motorists Ins. Co.
v. Kaplan, 20o9 Va. 53, 161 S.E.2d 675 (1968); Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Celina
Mut. Ins. Co., 209 Va. 6o, 161 S.E.2d 68o (1968).
zSee text accompanying note 15, supra.
22o9 Va. at 55, 161 S.E.2d at 677.
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of wording in the policy to give effect to the "other insurance" clause
and thereby hold the policy containing an "excess insurance" clause
primarily liable.
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Shelby Mutual Insurance Co.,so on
facts similar to those in Kaplan, the Supreme Court of North Caro-
lina distinguished the wording of the modified "other insurance"
clause, which included the terms "either primary or excess" from the
previous wording of the clause. The court said:
Here, the Shelby Mutual policy is not ambiguous with refer-
ence to the intent of the parties to exclude coverage under it
where the other policy contains an 'excess' clause. The Shelby
Mutual policy expressly makes the existence of such 'excess'
policy an event which sets the Shelby Mutual's exclusionary
clause into operation.
The clear meaning of this provision is that the existence
of an 'excess' policy (the Allstate policy) is an event which pre-
vents the Shelby Mutual policy from operating at all with
reference to [the permissive driver]. 31
The North Carolina decision is supported by an earlier decision
of the Supreme Court of Florida in Continental Casualty Co. v.
Weekes,32 construing a similarly worded exclusionary clause.3 3 How-
ever, two recent decisions by the Louisiana Court of Appeals in cases
involving policies with provisions identical to those in the North Caro-
lina case (and the recent Virginia cases of Kaplan and Celina Mutu-
al),34 took a different approach.
In Lincombe v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.35
and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Travelers In-
surance Co 3 6 the Louisiana court held the "other insurance" clauses
in the two policies mutually repugnant and required the insurance
companies to prorate the loss. In Lincombe the court reasoned that
3269 N.C. 341, 152 S.E.2d 436 (1967).
M15 2 S.E.2d at 443.
3'74 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1954).
13in Weekes the Florida Court was presented with an owner-lessor liability
provision stating that the insurance does not apply "to any liability for such
loss as is covered on a primary, contributory, excess, or any other basis by insurance
in another insurance company" and a driver-lessee liability clause providing only for
"excess" coverage over and above any other valid and collectible insurance. The
court concluded that since the former policy did not provide any contingent liability
for excess insurance, it should prevail over the latter.
"The policy provisions involved in Kaplan are set out in full supra at notes
9 and io.
5166 So. 2d 92o (La. App.), cert. denied, 246 La. 907, 168 So. 2d 820 (1964).
3184 So.2d 750 (La. App.) cert. denied, 249 La. 454-55, 187 So.2d 439 (1966).
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there was no real difference between the escape clauses in the two
policies as in each the purpose was "to relieve the insurer from all or
a portion of the liability which it otherwise would have if there
is other valid and collectible insurance of the same type available to
the insured."37 A concurring opinion by Judge Tate in State Farm
defended the conclusion of the court in Lincombe, stating:
In Lincombe, we correctly held it was impossible to reconcile
the respective 'excess' and 'escape' clauses in the two policies.
Indeed, there is actually no way by logic or word-sense to recon-
cile two such clauses, where each policy by itself can apply as
a primary insurer, but where the clause in each policy neverthe-
less attempts to make its own liability secondary to that of any
other policy issued by a similar primary insurer: For then the
primary and (attempted) secondary liability of each policy
chase the other through infinity, something like trying to an-
swer the question: which came first, the chicken or the egg3 8
The Louisiana court's assessment of the conflict between these
two clauses also finds support in an earlier decision.39 Furthermore,
the Louisiana court has made it clear that the inclusion of the terms
"either primary or excess" in the "other insurance" clause will not
change the rule in that state. As stated by the Court in Graves v. Trad-
ers & General Insurance Co.:40
In our judgment a clause using the phrase 'other valid and
collectible insurance' (without further qualification by way of
either extension or limitation) is equally inclusive (or exclu-
sive) as one which reads 'other valid and collectible insurance
either primary or excess.' 41
It might well be argued that prorating the loss between the in-
surers is the most equitable way to resolve the controversy between
these conflicting escape clauses. However, without making an at-
tempt to decide which interpretation is the best, it suffices to say
that the Virginia courts will have at least three alternatives in con-
struing the new Virginia statute and the policy provision approved
therein when such a provision comes in conflict with an "excess in-
surance" clause in another policy: (i) follow the interpretation of
the federal court in Zurich and conclude that the policy containing the
Wi66 So. 2d at 925.
3184 So. 2d at 753-54.
'Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d 958
(gth Cir. 1952).
40ooo So. 2d 67 (La. App. 1967).
'1Id. at 78.
1969]
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"excess insurance" clause does not provide other valid and collectible
insurance within the definition of the garage liability policy; (2)
follow the reasoning of the Louisiana court in Lincombe and State
Farm and hold the two clauses mutually repugnant, thereby requir-
ing the insurance companies to prorate the loss; or (3) read into the
statute the terms "either primary or excess" (or give effect to these
terms if the policy is so worded) in the "other insurance" clause and
conclude that the policy containing the "excess insurance" clause does
constitute other valid and collectible insurance within the terms of
the garage policy. Under the latter interpretation the policy contain-
ing the "excess" provision would be primarily liable, a result in accord
with the North Carolina court in Allstate. While it is impossible to
say which of these alternatives the Virginia court will choose to follow
when it is again presented with this issue, one conclusion can be
drawn-namely, that the 1968 amendment to the motor vehicle in-
surance statute does not provide the court with a clear-cut method
for applying the "other insurance" policy provision in a garage lia-
bility policy.
California has enacted a statute similar to the one recently adopted
by the Virginia legislature. 42 While no cases have been found in
which the courts of that state have construed this particular statute,4,
certain features of it should be noted.
"-CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.1 (1) (West Supp. 1967). The California statute provides:
(f) Where two or more policies are applicable to the same loss and one of
such policies affords coverage to a named insured engaged in selling,
repairing, servicing, delivering, testing, road testing, parking, or storing
automobiles, such policies may contain a provision that the insurance
coverage applicable to such motor vehicles afforded a person other than
the named insured or his agent or employee shall not be applicable if
there is any other valid and collectible insurance applicable to the same
loss covering such person as a named insured or as an agent or employee
of a named insured under a policy with limits at least equal to the financial
responsibility requirements specified in Section 16059 of the Vehicle Code;
and in such event, the two or more policies shall not be construed as
providing cumulative or concurrent coverage and only that policy which
covers the liability of such person as a named insured, or as an agent
or employee of a named insured, shall apply. In the event there is no
such other valid and collectible insurance, the coverage afforded a person
other than the named insured, his agent or employee, may be limited to
the financial responsibility requirements specified in Section 16o59 of the
Vehicle Code.
7'The fact that no case law has been found in which the California courts have
interpreted this statute may indicate that the California legislature has successfully
resolved the conflict between the "other insurance" clauses when one of the
policies involved in a garage liability policy. See text accompanying note 44 infra.
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Under the California statute, a garage policy may contain a pro-
vision under which the coverage normally afforded a person other
than the named insured, his agent or employee (e.g., a permissive
driver) will not be extended when such person is covered by other
valid and collectible insurance applicable to the same loss. However,
the California statute adds the following phrase not included in the
Virginia statute:
... and in such event [where there are two or more policies ap-
plicable to the same loss], the two or more policies shall not
be construed as providing cumulative or concurrent coverage
and only that policy which covers the liability of such person
as a named insured, or as an agent or employee of the named
insured, shall apply.44
The presence of this phrase would seem to relieve the courts of
the task of determining what constitutes other valid and collectible
insurance within the meaning of the "other insurance" clauses in
the garage policy. The statute apparently resolves this question by
stating that the entire burden of liability is placed on the permissive
driver of the vehicle who is a named insured or an agent or employee
of a named insured under another policy of liability insurance. The
garage policy would, therefore, provide coverage only when such per-
son is not covered by other insurance (or insurance with limits less
than the financial responsibility requirements of that State).
'While the wording of the Virginia and California statutes is simi-
lar in many respects, the California statute unequivocally states that
in the event there are two or more policies covering the same loss,
only that policy covering the driver as a named insured (or an agent
or employee of a named insured) will apply. The Virginia statute,
on the other hand, provides only that where there is other valid and
collectible insurance covering such permissive driver, the garage policy
will not apply. Since the Virginia statute does not expressly state what
shall constitute other valid and collectible insurance within the mean-
ing of that clause, the Virginia courts will be called upon to make this
determination. The courts might find that the permissive driver's
policy which contains a similar "escape" clause does not provide such
other valid and collectible insurance, following the reasoning of
cases such as Zurich; or conclude that two such clauses are irreconcil-
able and thereby require the insurance campanies to prorate the
loss, as the Louisiana courts have ruled. Of course, either of these
4CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.1(f) (West Supp. 1967) (emphasis added).
